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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Section
78-2-2(3)(j),- Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended.
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Appellant presents the following issues on appeal:
Does a PIP Claimant injured in an automobile accident have to
be enployed on the date of injury in order to qualify for PIP No Fault
Disability benefits provided for under Sectioti 31(a)-22-307(1)(b)(i),
Utah Code Annotated?
Did the Trial Court err when it ruled that a PIP disability
claimant must show both loss of gross income add loss of earning
capacity to qualify for disability benefits?
The Utah Supreme Court accords no deference to the Trial Court's
legal conclusions given to support the grant of a Motion for
Summary Judgment, but review(s) them for correctness.

Madsen v.

Borthick 769 P2d 245 (Ut 1988).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Section 31(a)-22-307 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended),
reads in relevant part as follows:
11

(1) Personal injury protection coverages
and benefits include: . . .
(b)(i) the lesser of $250 per week or 85%
of any loss of gross income and loss of earning
capacity per person from inability to work,for
a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the loss,
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A0

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an Appeal from a Summary Judgment granted by the Trial
Court who held that the injured housewife was not entitled to P IP
No Fault benefits because she was not employed on the date of injury, and hence suffered no loss of gross income,
B.

COURSE AND DISPOSITION OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The housewife made written demand on the insurance company for
payment of PIP Disability Benefits.
The housewife filed suitc

The insurance company refused.

On crogs-motions for Summary Judgment

the Trial Court ruled that the housewife was not entitled to benefits.

This Appeal ensued.
C.
1.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

The housewife was injured in an automobile accident 2/1/89.

(R.2,11 ).
2.

Defendant insurance company was the PIP No Fault insurer

at the time of the accident relevant herein.
3.

The housewife had not had actual employment for at least

13 months prior to the time of the accident.
4.

(R. 23 ) .

The housewife provided the insurer with documentation show-

ing her prior earning capacity.
6.

(R. 23, 55).

The housewife was starting to look for work at the time

of the accident o
5.

(R.2,11 ) .

(R. 35, 55).

The housewife was medically unable to work for one year

following the accident.

(R. 2

2

).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A plain reading of Section 31(a)-22-307 and the application
of simple arithmetic shows that the Court erroneously applied the
Statute.
The Legislature of Utah would have used more specific language if it intended that only those actually employed on the day
of accident were entitled to PIP Benefits.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
TRIAL COURT FAILED TO
PROPERLY APPLY STATUTE
Section 31A-22-307(l) (b) (i) requires a siqiple mathematical
computation.

The relevant statutory language reads:

". . . 857o

of any loss of gross income and loss of earning capacity . . .".
c85 X (any loss of gross income + loss of earning capacity) =
Under the facts of this case the next step in the computation
is:
.85 X (0 + $180) =

? .

The next step is:
.85 X $180 = $153.
It is clear from the face of the statute that a Claimant need
not have both loss of gross earnings and loss of earning capacity.
Loss of either is sufficient to support a claim for PIP Benefits
based on the mathematical formula setforth by the Legislature.
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POINT II,
THE STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE
THAT ONE BE EMPLOYED ON
THE DAY OF THE ACCIDENT
A review of the authorities shows that no case law exists in
Utah which is directly on point with the question presented on
this appeal.

A review of the authorities of neighboring states

as well as the leading scholarly treatise shows that the other
states that have addressed the issue have varied widely in their
rulings.
In the Colorado case of Bondi v. Liberty Mutual Auto Ins0 Co.,
757 P 2d, 1101, 1102 (Colo, 1988) the Supreme Court of Colorado
ruled that a Claimant who was employed at the time of the accident
could not get No Fault benefits.

However, it should be noted that

the Colorado Court made much of the fact that the Colorado No Fault
Statute only used the words "gross income".

The words "loss of

earning capacity" did not appear in the Colorado Statue.

The clear

implication of the Colorado Court's holding was that if the Legislature had used "loss of earning capacity" in the statute a different decision would have resulted.
In the Kansas case of Morgan v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins9 Co.
613 P 2d 684 (Kan. App0 1980), a case dealing with an unemployed person who had no prior employment history and fho firm offer of future
employment", it was ruled that a claimant needed more than a mere
hope of employment.

It was held that a claimant would need to pro-

duce evidence sufficient to convince a tryer of fact that regular

4

employment was a reasonable expectation.
In Pennsylvania in the case of Marryshaw £/. Nationwide Mutual
Ins. Coo, 452 A 2d 530 (1982) it was held at 532 that the absence
of employment history was not a per se bar to entitlement to benefits.

However, it should be noted that the Pennsylvania statute

specifically provided for persons who had no employment history and
allowed such persons to collect at the rate of 50% of normal benefits.

(See also Minier v. State Farm Mutual |Vuto Ins. Co., 454 A 2d

1078 (1982).
The only thorough review of the issue presented on this appeal
discovered by Appellant appears in Blashfield Automotive Law and
Practice, revised 3rd edition, 1987, West Publishing Co. Section 314.9.
Blashfield shows that the various States have requirements ranging
from "must be employed", to "must have firm offer of employment", to
"complete lack of earning history not being a jper se bar to recovery".
Even in those States which usually bar benefits if one is unemployed
at the time of the injury are generally exceptions for those who are
"temporarilly" unemployed, such as strikers or teachers.
Rules of Statutory Construction require tfcat when the Legislature
uses a word that has a well known legal meaning the Courts are to
give the word its precise legal meaning when construing the statute.
State v. Franklin 735 P 2d 34 (Ut 1989).

There is a major difference

between the words "gross income" and "earning capacity".

The Legi-

slature, had it intended that only those employed on the date of the
accident would receive benefits "was free to use words such as 'actually employed1, 'loss of gross income1, wages lost from actual em-

5

ployment1, or any of a number of other phrases which would have
clearly setforth the idea that only those who have actual employment on the date of injury are entitled to PIP Disability Benefits11.
CONCLUSION
The housewife involved in this case, although she had been unemployed for 13 months, had an earning capacity.

The Statute pro-

vides for compensation for those who have suffered a loss of earning capacity.

While the Statute itself does not provide much guid-

ance, it is clear that the Legislature intended that accident victims be compensated.
WHEREFORE Appellant prays for relief as follows:
1.

That the Order of the Trial Court granting Summary Judgment

be set aside;
2.

That this matter be remanded for such other and further

proceedings as may be appropriate in the Trial Court.
DATED this

//

day of D*w**ftber/, 1££Q. W / .

}V%

k:::
ROBERT BREEZE
=
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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